Source/Credit: The News | Special Report
By I.A. Rehman | January 9, 2010
The government is in no position to take the phalanx of orthodox forces head-on
The assassination of Governor Salmaan Taseer and the installation of the killer in the pantheon of heroes by Pakistan’s largest Muslim sect confirm the urgency of a review of the strategy for a discourse on the two most fundamental issues — the nature of the Pakistan state and which of the several interpretations of Islam it should recognize and follow.
Any unbiased assessment of the objective reality will prove that the state has lost the capacity to assert its authority against extremists flying the religious standard and that the largest Muslim sect, Ahle Sunnat wal-Jamat, or Barelvis as they are variously called, have found in the defence of the blasphemy law a means to pressurise the state and block the path of the Taliban who are led by the Deobandi-Wahabi axis.
The difference of opinion on the status of prophethood between the Barelvis and the Wahabis is no secret. The Muslims of the subcontinent, especially of Punjab, have not forgotten what the Saudi Arabian government did to the Jannat-ul-Baqih. When the two sects fought for the control of the Badshahi Masjid in Lahore in the 1980s one of them had inscribed only Allah on its banners while the other wielded sticks under the banner of ‘Muhammad’ (PBUH) or simply ‘Rasool-Allah’ (PBUH).
Last week’s events show that the Ahle Sunnat have been encouraged by the rival sects’ inability to disagree with them on the question of Tahafuzz-i-Namoos-i-Rasool (PBUH) (protection of the Holy Prophet’s [PBUH] dignity). The unprecedented edict issued by several hundred clerics denying Salmaan Taseer the right to Islamic funeral prayers means that the Ahle Sunnat, who had been relegated hitherto to a secondary status vis-à-vis the smaller but richer and better armed Deobandi faction now feel strong enough to claim the overall leadership of the faithful.
True, the doctrinal disagreements between the main Muslim sects will eventually drive them towards a sanguinary conflict. They may have to go a long way before the ordinary Pakistani Muslims confer the mantle of political leadership on them. However, there should be no doubt that an alliance of orthodox scholars and clerics may soon start bidding for power. The threat to the democratic foundations of the state has grown many times over.
The government is in no position to take the phalanx of orthodox forces head-on. It is likely to surpass its predecessor authorities in buying security through more vigorous policies of appeasement. The political authority also faces increasing isolation from other organs/institutions of the state. The political parties in opposition have already demonstrated lack of interest in resisting the surge in the forces of religious bigotry. The civil armed forces and perhaps the judiciary too are in the same category. Even the armed forces are unlikely to be ready for a repeat of the Lal Masjid. That leaves a section of the civil society as the only real defenders of democratic governance.
Can these elements of civil society save the democratic experiment? They can, in the long run if not in the short term, by adopting a feasible strategy that should be based on a correct assessment of the reality on the ground. They must realise that matters have gone beyond a rational debate on the blasphemy law and that democrats are in a minority in Pakistan. Until they become a majority, does not matter if they are largely passive supporters’ of democracy and not active ones, things cannot change for the better. The declining capacity of minority forces to run a state in modern times is the most unforgettable lesson of the reverses democratic forces suffered in Chile, Nicaragua and Afghanistan.
Secondly, while resisting the trend towards Pakistan’s transformation into a complete theocracy they must not ignore the fact that in an economically under-developed country where feudal thinking is extremely strong, a frontal attack on the religious sensibilities of the majority will be fatal to the advocates of change. This majority’s mindset will change only when democratic outfits start delivering on their promise, economic progress makes dents in the feudal social order, and the faithful are exposed to the liberal interpretation of their faith.
Thirdly, it is imperative that the civil society shifts its focus from the symptoms of a deep-rooted malaise, such as militancy and discriminatory laws and practices, to the root causes of Pakistan’s progressive deviation from its foundational ideals.
All this means that it is necessary to launch a fresh and vigorous discourse on the nature of the state. The democrats are right in claiming that Pakistan was meant to be a democratic state of the Muslims living within its geographical confines and not a religious state but a majority’ of the Pakistanis have been converted to the political heresy that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and must be a fortress of its orthodoxy.
For the consolidation of this view of Pakistan only a little credit can be given to political clerics who had opposed the Pakistan idea and eventually started claiming to be its original authors, and much greater role has been played by others. By the time the Quaid-i-Azam died, the rulers of Pakistan had started using religion to cover up their deviations from the democratic path. The authors of the first constitution laid the foundation of a theocracy.
From 1952 onwards Pakistan remained under the spell of the Cold War ideologues who declared that Pakistan’s religious identity was the sole guarantee of its survival. The 1965 war with India and the 1970-71 war with Bengali Pakistanis were fought under the religious standard.
The founders of the PPP acknowledged the pull of belief by declaring Islam as one of the polity’s pillars. Later on they fell for King Faisal’s theory of Islamic nationalism and the second amendment and the Islamic Summit both came in 1974. In the second half of the seventies, General Zia concocted a new theory of jihad (by young men who knew little of Islam and the world) and revised the definition of a Muslim in the constitution. Thus, the state has steadily moved away from the Quaid’s concept of Pakistan and towards its definition by Gen. Zias or junior clerics. Is anyone surprised at rose petals being showered on Salmaan Taseer’s assassin?
In addition, the state has ignored the need to ensure the people’s access to the liberal traditions of Islam for which the Muslims of the subcontinent were known from the 16th century till partition. There was a time when it was possible for the Institute of Islamic Culture to publish Khalifa Abdul Hakim’s book on democracy and egalitarianism as integral parts of the Islamic Ideology or Justice S. A. Rahman’s rebuttal of the theory about the beheading of apostates (one wonders why these books and much of Iqbal have not yet been proscribed). But for the last 30 years or so, the field has been left open to theological hair-splitters, obscurantists and preachers of hatred. Forget the texts being taught in madrassas, and just take a look at the bulk of religious tracts that are published year after year and which are read by people across the country.
On the other hand, the Pakistani people are completely unaware of the research on Islam being carried out in different parts of the world. Those who dare to disagree with the orthodox view of Islam cannot stay in Pakistan.
All those who wish to save Pakistan for democracy, humanism and peace must accept the challenge of changing the popular concept of the Pakistan state and affording the people possibilities of purging their concept of Islam of the accretions made by exploiters of belief for political reasons. This is going to be a long haul but there is much comfort in Saadi’s dictum,
(Take the correct path even though it is a longer route to the destination.)
Read original post here: Beyond rational discourse
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