Ahmadiyah attack a threat to Indonesia’s democracy

Indonesia’s democracy presents an intriguing case to examine. Not only because its democracy is young and vibrant, but also because of the risk that would increase the potential for a stagnant, if not a setback, democracy.

Photo: Antara

Ahmadiyya Times | News Watch | Int'l Desk
Source/Credit: The Jakarta Post | Opinion
By Hadianto Wirajuda, London | February 10, 2011

Two international relations scholars, Ed Mansfield and Jack Snyder, suggest that one of the characteristics of transition to democracy is the weakness of state institutions and the tendency for political elites to use negative nationalism to gain votes.

In this case, the risks of internal conflict, and to some extent inter-state war, also rise. Countries experiencing such a condition, they argued, are categorized as incomplete democratization. On the other hand, consolidated democracy — as asserted by Juan Linz — reflects a condition in which none of the major political actors, parties, or organized interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic processes to gain power, and that no political institution has a claim to veto the action of a democratically elected government.


Furthermore, democracy is classified into two categories: formal democracy, which relates closely to the procedures, and material democracy, the end result of democracy or, in other words, substantive democracy. Now, apply this concept to the case of Indonesia and ask, what can be inferred from it?

Indonesia’s democracy presents an intriguing case to examine. Not only because its democracy is young and vibrant, but also because of the risk that would increase the potential for a stagnant, if not a setback, democracy. In this case, I would like to discuss the internal conflict within the society and the risks of Indonesia’s failing democracy.

While Indonesia has been peaceful toward its neighboring countries, its domestic situation often suggests the opposite. In terms of democratic polity, we can assume that people are bound to democratic ideals, which include, inter alia, respect to the rule of law and adherence to peaceful means in conflict resolution. However, contrary to this argument, people in Indonesia — although they may only constitute a minority in the society — tend to favor violence at the expense of pacifist means in resolving disputes about diversity of belief.

A recent case that victimized Ahmadiyah followers in Pandeglang, Banten, and the Tuesday’s mob rule in Temanggung, Central Java, were the latest addition to Indonesia’s list of internal conflict and, arguably, the impotence of state authorities against thugs. This tragedy, I believe, empirically confirms the Wahid Institute’s (WI) finding published early this year that an increase is taking place in religious intolerance and communal violence in Indonesia, with West Java topping the list.

According to the report, physical attacks on individuals and places of worship of other religions, and imposition and limitation of faith toward others topped the survey, constituting 71 percent of the religious intolerance cases. Interestingly, when the report looked into the religious-based perpetrators, the regional Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) sits second just below hard-line Muslim group the Islam Defenders Front (FPI).

MUI, theoretically, has been the house of wisdom for Indonesia’s Muslims, as in the case of the Family Planning (KB) program under Soeharto’s regime. At the time, MUI helped clarify that KB was not forbidden by Islam, which explains the success of the program. As a state-formed organization, it is sensible to expect the MUI to walk in the same line as the government.

What I mean by this is when pluralism is being promoted widely in every speech of our leaders at home and abroad, it should also be seen as a policy of the government to respect and ensure pluralism at home. Therefore, state-formed organizations should logically promote the same. Clearly, the WI findings as stated in the above did not confirm this claim.

Identity-based, if not religious-based, violence which occurred in various places in Indonesia, theoretically, may jeopardize Indonesia’s democratic stature. However, others can also say that there is no democracy in this world that is free of problems. I agree with this preposition.

Nevertheless, what is important to note in the case of Indonesia is first, the growing assumption that the “state has lost” (negara kalah), because the institutions formed in the democratic nature and leaders who were being elected democratically appear to be weakened by the inability to prevent, let alone investigate, such conflicts. Second, should the decision makers undermine this kind of domestic problems and therefore, only react when a case has already taken place, Indonesia should evaluate the assertion of valuing pluralism in their speeches elsewhere.

Third, having seen half of the video of the recent tragedy in Pandeglang (yes, only half because I could not stand the ruthless of those uncivilized people), it appears that “moderation” of Indonesia’s Islam only belongs to the normative speech of the elites and, to some extent, perhaps the urban people. The fourth and the most important thing is should internal conflict, or identity-based violence, persist Indonesia might trap itself in a stage of a mere unconsolidated democracy, if not an advanced democratizing state.

Consequently, this can rule out our credibility and image as the world’s third-largest democracy and a place of harmonious relations between democracy and Islam. Should these four assumptions happen, I would not be surprised if the concerned academic literature subsequently put Indonesia as an example of a falling democracy.


The writer is a PhD student of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and a scholar of LSE IDEAS. This is his personal view.

Read original post here: Ahmadiyah attack a threat to Indonesia’s democracy