Source/Credit: Times of India | TNN
By Josy Joseph | November 7, 2011
NEW DELHI: That India does not have a strategic culture is a common complaint. To see the most stunning evidence for the missing vision of future, utter failure to read what was unfurling in the neighbourhood, one doesn't need to look too far than in the recently declassified files of the ministry of external affairs.
Despite its obsession with Pakistan, India's foreign establishment completely misread the intentions of General Zia-ul-Haq, as he took power through a military coup in July 1977, reveal these declassified files, now in the custody of the National Archives.
The stunning failure is not just limited to reading correctly how Gen Zia's military rule would play out for Pakistan, Afghanistan and India and impact the way fundamentalist Islam would sneak into every arm of Pakistani governance. But the documents also narrate how naive the Indian foreign establishment was in presuming Gen Zia's approach towards deposed prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
Fifteen days after the early morning coup on July 5, 1977 by Pakistan army, the Indian foreign secretary sent out a telegram to all Indian missions, detailing his assessment of the coup. Almost all key conclusions by the then foreign secretary J S Mehta stand out in complete contrast to what later played out in Pakistan.
Matching the foreign secretary, and going beyond, in blundering on reading the intentions of Pakistan's new military ruler was the Pakistan-Afghanistan division of MEA, which too detailed its wrong assessments of what would happen in Pakistan over the next several years.
"Prolonged army rule in Pakistan does not appear to be in anyone's interest there," Mehta said, predicting an end to the military rule in a few months time. "He (Gen Zia) has categorically stated on several occasions that takeover was necessary to prevent civil war, his prime objective being to supervise political solution. His 90-day plan makes it incumbent on him to arrange polls in October. All public indications so far suggest that he means what he says," Mehta said.
It is not clear how these inaccurate assessments by the foreign policy establishment may have affected other policy decisions and aspects of Indian response on Gen Zia's moves through over a decade of his rule, when he significantly Islamised Pakistani governance, extended full support to and executed an American plan to create mujahideen to fight Russia in Afghanistan, which gave birth to Osama bin Laden, global jihad and a new generation of fighters in Kashmir.
The PakAf (Pakistan-Afghanistan) division of MEA was equally convinced about Gen Zia immediately revoking military rule. "As of now, Gen Zia appears to be sincere in his protestations that his takeover of power is purely of an interim nature, to cool ruffled tempers, stabilize the internal situation and prepare the nation for elections in October 1977. There is so far no reason to disbelieve his repeated assurances that the survival of Pakistan lies in democracy alone and that he is working on the basis of a '90-day operation' to put the country back on a democratic footing," the PakAf division concluded in a five-page note.
In complete contrast, Gen Zia remained the military ruler of Pakistan for over a decade until August 1988 when he died in a mysterious air crash.
On Gen Zia's religious attitude, the foreign secretary told his missions, "Gen Zia-ul-Haq is said to be devout but not a fanatic and is professional in outlook." The PakAf division of the ministry was equally convinced about Gen Zia not being a fanatic.
"The concessions to Islamic Shariat Law and Nizam-i-Mustafa are doubtless meant to neutralize any serious opposition to the unconstitutional takeover of government by the armed forces, but not necessarily an indication of ambition to continue in power. It also incidentally gains for the regime the support of orthodox political elements," it said.
However, during his 11-year rule, Gen Zia introduced a series of laws that pushed Pakistan into the stranglehold of Islamic laws, and helped him consolidate his grip over the country. From amputation as punishment (Hudood) to Zina Ordinance (relating to adultery and biased against rape victims) and blasphemy laws, a series of steps by Gen Zia removed most secular aspects of Pakistani governance.
MEA misread Zia 'sympathy' for Bhutto
The most embarrassing aspect of the assessments by the foreign establishment is what they thought would be Gen Zia's approach towards Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was thrown out of power in the military coup. The foreign secretary said in his missive, "The evidence on the whole suggests army has been even-handed with regard to PPP and PNA. Zia has consistently refused to entertain demands to put Bhutto on trial and has even said Bhutto's participation in the elections would be in the interest of the nation."
The PakAf division said, "His (Gen Zia's) reported statements do contain an element of sympathy for Mr Bhutto. He has gone to the extent of absolving him of any guilt in the rigging of the March elections, of describing him as a man with a sense of history and claiming that his participation in the October elections would be in the interests of the nation." In complete contrast to all those assessments, Bhutto was put on trial and on April 4, 1979 was hanged to death.
The Sunday TOI on Sunday brought out a set of documents of the MEA that threw fresh light on the 1971 war, including the intense US hostility towards India, the fact that America had three Marine battalions on standby to intervene in favour of Pakistan, and that the US mysteriously delayed informing India about the Pakistani offer to surrender in Dhaka by almost a day.
Read original post here: MEA totally misread General Zia-ul-Haq’s intentions after coup, show declassified papers
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