Source/Credit: The News | Pakistan
By Talat Farooq | February 13, 2012
A bend in the road is not the end of the road... unless you fail to make the turn. (Anonymous)
The ground realities seem to have persuaded the United States and the Taliban to at least agree to disagree in Qatar. The fact that the two major parties to the conflict have agreed to negotiate demonstrates their willingness to compromise on certain issues to ensure achievement of long-term objectives. Earlier, the Taliban’s consideration of any talks was conditional to withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. The US too remained rhetorically committed to never talking to the terrorists while making efforts to engage the Taliban for quite some time now. It is somewhat early to bet on winners and losers. No victory will ever be complete without a peaceful and progressive Afghanistan. How will these negotiations unfold and what will be the final result may be viewed with some skepticism in keeping with the proverbial slip ‘twixt the cup and the lip. Yet, both the US and the Taliban being realists will continue to safeguard their self-interests without giving in to emotionalism.
It may be a bit early to hope that the talks will lead to long-term stability in Afghanistan. There can be no peace in Afghanistan without a proportionate ethnic representation in the government. A lopsided Pakhtun dominance, even in the name of religion, will not be acceptable to other ethnic groups. It is also important to understand that continued armed conflict has become a way of life for the Taliban and their opponents; in a war-ravaged Afghanistan, in particular, it is a lucrative source of power and income; its temptation may be too hard to resist. Moreover, the Taliban are very likely to adhere to their violent obscurantism of the 1990s; this may in itself contribute to dysfunction and instability. Checks and balances would therefore be in order; the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army will ultimately depend on the pragmatism of the Afghans that induces them to switch sides without remorse.
Although the Karzai government has been sidelined Pakistan may still be a party; how much would it gain in the end remains to be seen. It is highly unlikely that once in power the Taliban will be any more willing to cater to Pakistani wish list than they were twelve years ago. Anyone who thinks that a stubborn Mullah Omar and his coterie of misogynists have mellowed into sympathetic spirits is living in a fool’s paradise.
When the US left this region to its own devices in the early 1990s the Taliban emerged as a potent threat to America within a decade. It is highly unlikely that America will leave in 2014 without securing its own national security interests in the region. That it does not trust either the Taliban or Pakistan is quite clear. India therefore is likely to have a major piece of the pie despite Pakistan’s aspirations to the contrary. In his new preface to the recently published paperback edition of Deadly Embrace, Bruce Riedel makes the following policy prescriptions for the US:
“The ISI can and will veto any peace efforts with the Taliban it opposes. Rather than counting on ISI help, we need to continue to build an Afghan army that can control the insurgency with long-term Nato assistance and minimal US combat troops. Fortunately, we are doing so now for the first time. India is critical in all of this. Obama has wisely invested time and capital in building ties to New Delhi, visiting there in November 2010. A strategic dialogue between America and India on Pakistan is essential; and this could focus the Pakistani army’s mind more fully on the counterproductive results of its policies and force it to reconsider its strategic plans. We should also increase intelligence cooperation against terror targets in Pakistan. India can play an important role in helping Afghanistan, and we should encourage that to happen.”
He then goes on to suggest that “accountability needs to be introduced into our approach to the army and the ISI. When we learn an ISI officer is engaged in assisting terror, whether in the Afghan or Indian theatres, we should make it personal.”
Does the above give us a glimpse into the immediate future of Pakistan? What will be the future trajectory of the Pakistani strategic interests? Addressing the Kashmir Convention recently Prime Minister Gilani said, “Gone are the days when individuals made foreign policy,” adding that policies would now be made by an elected parliament. In the same breath, however, the prime minister reiterated that the Kashmir issue remained the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy! Maulana Fazlur Rahman gleefully endorsed his view. Sure, they talked about only the “political, diplomatic and moral support” to the Kashmir cause, but we know better.
Why can we not re-evaluate the Kashmir problem in earnest and seriously look for effective and internationally acceptable ways of approaching this issue? Will our lives and the lives of our future generations be guided by our fear of Indian regional hegemony or will we be able to move past the Kashmir problem? Have we learnt that Kashmir cannot be resolved militarily or through proxy warfare?
Is there a realisation somewhere at the policy-making level that India is a huge country with far more resources than Pakistan and that in trying to “bleed” it we have managed to haemorrhage Pakistan – both economically and in terms of prestige? At the same time this policy has not ensured Kashmir’s secession from India. On the other hand, India has successfully convinced the world of Pakistan’s “terrorist” activities in Kashmir.
And what of the Durand Line issue? Is a Taliban-led friendly government in Kabul going to finally resolve this dispute? Do we even want it to be resolved? Has it not suited our policymakers to take advantage of the porous western border? Has this not made the issue of the Durand Line fundamentally irrelevant? In the event of the Taliban’s coming to power, should we expect continuity in the Taliban influence in our tribal region and its onward dissemination into our urban areas? Does this not hurt our sovereignty as badly as the US drone attacks?
In short, will Pakistan continue to function as a national security state where the army calls the shots? Or will it eventually move towards democracy in the real sense of the word? Will the 180 million people ever become the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies?
Instead of anticipating a glamorised Taliban victory in Qatar, we should be contemplating these questions.
The writer is a PhD student at Leicester, UK. Email: talatfarooq11@gmail.com
Read original post here: A bend in the road
We can't solve Kashmir issue or Durand Line issue through military power, we have been doing it since 1947 but it has failed. Had we used peaceful diplomacy, both these problems and many more would have solved.
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