Amjad Mahmood Khan, Esq.
(Written for the Human Rights Journal at Harvard Law School)
Before September 11, 2001, the United States characterized the Pakistani government as an unstable regime with a tarnished history of corrupt dictators, military coups, and territorial violence along its borders.[1] Following the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, Pakistan became a leading partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, thrust into a position to bring “international criminals” to justice and to act as a hero for the “civilized” world.[2] Indeed, one of the lessons of September 11 is that exigencies often spur credulity. United States concerns with Pakistan’s human rights problems lost significance once Pakistan agreed to stand with the United States against terrorism.
Pakistan’s leaders saw September 11 as an opportunity to gain redemption. Blasted in the past for conducting nuclear testing, suspending its Constitution, and breeding Islamists, Pakistan, post–September 11, was in an excellent position to curry favor with its critics by suffocating terrorist networks. Seizing upon this opportunity, President Pervez Musharraf led a fight against militant Islam. This shift in Pakistan’s priorities resulted in a decrease in attention paid to the plight of religious minorities in Pakistan, once a recognized problem of serious international concern.[3] The two issues of human rights and terrorism were treated as unconnected, without the slightest suggestion that addressing the former would be helpful in addressing the latter.
For a full, objective account of the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, including the unjustified persecution of the movement see S. R. Valentine, Islam & the Ahmadiyya Jama'at, Columbia University Press, 2008 and S. Gregory & S. R. Valentine, "The Persecution of Religious Minority Groups in Pakistan", report commissioned by UNHCR, May 2009.
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