History, For the Record: 1965: Operation Grand Slam

When the operation was initially planned, GHQ was aware that Gen Malik was commanding an over-extended division, under immense pressure from the enemy. But he was still chosen to command this offensive.

Ahmadiyya Times | News Watch | Int'l Desk
Source/Credit: Daily Times | Pakistan
Op/Ed | Shaukat Qadir | Republish from October 4, 2003

Perhaps if Akhnur had been captured and the Indian lines of communication severed, the Indian attack on Sialkot would never have occurred! Perhaps. But that we will never know

Operation Grand Slam was one of a number of contingency plans that had been prepared in support of Gibraltar. Since Gibraltar’s failure was considered inconceivable, this plan was intended to sever the road-link between India and Indian-held Kashmir once the Valley was up in flames. But eventually this plan was put into action to relieve pressure on troops defending Kashmir once Gibraltar had failed and led to the loss of some key posts in Kashmir.

Many writers have attributed the plan to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This is inaccurate. It was a prepared contingency plan and one that appealed to Mr Bhutto. Since he was among the favoured ministers of the time he might have influenced the contingency plan selected but even if he did it was the most viable and sensible military option.


I would like to add here that recently Benazir Bhutto has been castigated by some and defended by others for revealing details of the presentation of a military plan to an Indian publication. Whether or not she should have done so is another matter but in defence of General Pervez Musharraf it must be stated that what he presented was a contingency plan. To distort the incident and present Musharraf as a warmonger is unfair. The assessment also fails to understand the contingency.

Operation Grand Slam was four phased: the capture of Chamb, the crossing of river Tawi and consolidation, followed by the capture of Akhnur, and finally severing the Indian lines of communication and capturing Rajauri. Despite the difficult terrain, including a river that had to be crossed, the possibility for success lay in the bold audacity of the plan. It necessitated speedy execution, since a delay would have meant that the Indians would reinforce Akhnur, and make it invulnerable to capture.

In last week’s article, I did say a few words about Maj Gen Akhtar Malik, but they were insufficient. He was a bold and audacious commander who remained unruffled under pressure and inspired confidence in his men, not just the officers but even the soldiers, making them rise above themselves. He was the epitome of the commander for such a venture.

When the operation was initially planned, GHQ was aware that Gen Malik was commanding an over-extended division, under immense pressure from the enemy. But he was still chosen to command this offensive. In fact, at most times he was commanding forces greater than 1 Corps, our only corps at that time.

This is why it is surprising that he should have been removed from the command of 12 Div. The fact that his division was over-extended was a known fact. No record is available about the causes and one can only speculate. In my view, while Gen Malik was most suited for undertaking such an operation, there was some sense that he could do little to influence events in Kashmir. Since Grand Slam was initially linked to the success and later to the failure of Gibraltar, unity of command may have been a consideration for the achievement of the aim, because of which he was selected to command this operation.

One has also to bear in mind that at this time the Pakistan army had only two lieutenant generals: only one, Bakhtiar Rana, was commanding a corps while the second, Altaf Qadir, was on deputation to CENTO. In addition, the army had only a handful of major generals.

The operation was to commence at 05:00 am on September 1. Initially it went as planned. Chamb fell within the hour and soon after first light around 07:00 am our troops started crossing the river Tawi. Operations from here onwards continued speedily and by 01:00 pm troops had consolidated and were ready to move into concentration areas from where an attack on Akhnur could have commenced well before last light around 03:00 pm. However we were not destined to reach Akhnur which remained, in the words of Dr Ahmed Faruqui, ‘a town too far’.

Akhtar Malik was a man of action and that’s where he was, in the thick of battle. Unfortunately, because he was commanding another formation, he did not have the facility of staff officers. Consequently, he found little time to communicate with GHQ, which had no idea of the battle situation. Gen Musa flew in to Kharian on a helicopter around 11:30 am on September 2 to find out firsthand what was happening. When he could not discover much there, he flew towards the border, spotting some vehicles en route.

Prior to the commencement of Grand Slam, another offensive division commanded by Maj-Gen Yahya had been asked to concentrate at Gujrat to meet any unforeseen contingency. The vehicles that Gen Musa spotted were those of Yahya and his staff out on a reconnaissance mission. From here Musa established contact with Akhtar Malik who was ordered to report to the C-in-C Musa. Akhtar Malik found the C-in-C by about 01:00 pm.

Though the official reason for the change of command of Operation Grand Slam at this stage was that Akhtar Malik could not handle troops from Northern Areas to Kharian, this is hardly very credible. It was known when he was assigned the task that he would be handling troops over this stretch. It has also been alleged that Ayub changed the command so that Yahya could claim credit and be appointed the next chief but records indicate that this decision was taken by Musa and subsequently ratified through a signal by GHQ.

Consequently, once again I am forced to speculate; perhaps Musa was annoyed at not having been informed and been made to wait a few hours. Once contact had been established, he could well have received an update on the wireless, rather than waste precious time by ordering the successful commander to return. Whatever the reason for changing horses midstream, precious time was lost while Akhtar Malik returned, briefed Yahya, who then assumed command, understood the situation on ground and then issued orders. In the meantime, Akhnur was reinforced and became unattainable.

In fairness to Yahya, who has often been accused of having failed, probably anyone else in his place would have taken just as long and suffered the same fate. Perhaps the troops were also disheartened by the change of command. Perhaps even the flamboyant Akhtar Malik would not have been able to take Akhnur.

Perhaps if Akhnur had been captured and the Indian lines of communication severed, the Indian attack on Sialkot could never have occurred! Perhaps. But that we will never know. What we do know is that Akhnur was never captured and this led to the attack on Lahore and later Sialkot in the wee hours of September 6 1965. If nothing else, Grand Slam did release the pressure on the troops defending the LoC in Kashmir and Northern Areas.

The author is a retired brigadier. He is also the ex-founder Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI)



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