Indian intelligence sources perceive a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in Jalalabad a signal that Pakistan based militant groups – especially the LeT – may be embarking on a new campaign against India with the blessings of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies.
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Source/Credit: The News | Pakistan
By Talat Farooq | August 28, 2013
In his recent interview with the Daily Telegraph Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif emphasised his “mandate for peace with India.” Asserting that the arms race must end and outstanding issues be resolved through peaceful means if “we have to progress”; he reiterated picking up “the threads from where we left off in 1999.”
Be it the Simla Agreement or the Lahore Declaration, the civilian leadership in Pakistan has shown willingness to adopt diplomacy as a means for issue resolution and Sharif’s professed desire may not be a far-fetched idea.
That said building trust with one’s enemy is not that simple. Picking up the much-entangled threads after 1999 is a complicated feat as the region moves towards a post-2014 Afghanistan. Once again, as in the 1990s, a great power’s withdrawal/drawdown is expected to increase tensions between the two neighbours by aggravating respective security compulsions. Disentangling threads may not be easy in view of all that has transpired from 1999 to date including the Kargil crisis and the Mumbai attacks.
Indian fears emerge from the perception that once the Americans leave, the restraint on Pakistan’s jihadist outfits is bound to weaken. According to a news report, Indian intelligence sources perceive a botched suicide bombing of an Indian consulate in Jalalabad a signal that Pakistan based militant groups – especially the LeT – may be embarking on a new campaign against India with the blessings of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies.
The Indian view appears to present a dilemma as expressed in a former RAW official’s view: “If the jihadists claim success in Afghanistan, they could turn their attention to us. Equally, if they fail, they will attack in wrath.” The situation is further influenced by the forthcoming Indian general elections.
In contrast, Islamabad is wary of India’s expansive diplomacy In Afghanistan perceiving it as contributing to instability on its western border. It further views Indian assistance to the Baloch separatist elements as an existential threat. According to the Pakistani perspective, in view of serious internal security challenges it is unlikely that Islamabad has any appetite for external conflict. The two uneasy neighbours are thus once again resorting to the familiar narrative underpinning the bilateral relationship over the last six decades.
The unfolding events on the LoC are a grim reminder of how spoilers in the two countries can hold India-Pakistan relations hostage to security-oriented compulsions. There is no doubt that Islamabad should not be dragged into escalating the LoC situation so as to be able to concentrate on the domestic terrorist threat. Sharif’s statements are, therefore, politically correct. Unfortunately, politically-correct rhetoric – whether emerging from Islamabad or New Delhi – does not spontaneously spawn or enhance cooperation.
There are strong academic arguments in favour of mistrust as an important causal factor in the initiation of wars and trust-building as the most significant reason for the end of a conflict. However, reaching out to each other for negotiated settlement of disputes takes a great deal more than good intentions. During the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in 1987 the US president quoted a Russian proverb – ‘Trust but verify’. The saying captured the mistrust between the two Cold War adversaries but also suggested that trust could be built if verbal promises were followed by verifiable actions.
As if inspired by the proverb, says scholar Andrew Kydd, the subsequent Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty contained “verification provisions that were unprecedented in U.S.-Soviet arms control.” Similarly, trust-building that began to develop between Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s was manifested in the verifiable action of opening up their sensitive nuclear facilities for scrutiny. Clearly, it is visible state behaviour and not unobservable intentions which inspire confidence or aggravate fear in others.
Of course, each of the above-cited historical events had its own dynamics and peculiarities and one cannot replicate and apply it blindly to India-Pakistan relations. Nonetheless, such historical instances illustrate that cooperation between erstwhile enemies is as much a reality as the perpetuation of conflict.
Indian and Pakistani economic interests can converge and gradually move towards improvement in an international climate where technological advancement has opened up means of communication between the two societies like never before. Cooperation can thus flow from convergent rational self-interests in one area and positively impact the other provided Pakistan benefits equally from the interaction. This is not to claim that this will happen – only that it is possible. Such policy choices, however, require statesmanship and a mature strategic mindset- two commodities that are in short supply on both sides of the border.
While extending the olive branch to our enemy in the east, Sharif has thought it wise to do the same in the west. His interior and information ministers are at pains to point out that the government has set no pre-condition during the recent DCC meeting for holding a dialogue with extremists including the TTP. A news report (The News, August 26) quotes the TTP’s confirmation of the PML-N’s alleged “unannounced deal” with the Punjabi Taliban through Malik Ishaq of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, who actually commands the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. If true, this is shameful and short-sighted.
The militants must lay down their weapons before any negotiations can begin. Losing their family members to US drone strikes or Pakistani military operations is deplorable but does not justify their random acts of violence against innocent civilians. Offering unconditional talks in the hope that the TTP will turn over a new leaf and keep its side of the bargain is sheer appeasement and appeasing the enemy does not produce favourable outcomes.
Be it peace with India or talks with the Taliban, nothing can work unless the civil-military leadership is in agreement. During TV show on August 24, Chaudhry Nisar – while discussing the government’s talks offer to the militants – stressed that political and military decision-makers were on the same page. Interestingly, the same day Rana Sanaullah – appearing on another TV channel – categorically denied any such consensus. It seems the PML-N leadership will have to compare intra-party pages before claiming compatibility with the army’s page. Without genuine consensus the government will fail to mobilise public opinion in favour of its approach.
Reaching out to the adversary may be a good political move but for this move to evolve into a viable strategy it is important that civil-military stakeholders trust each other.
The writer is a PhD student at Leicester, UK. Email: talatfarooq11@gmail.com
Read original post here: Trusting the enemy
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