US-Pakistan relations: In defence of realism

When it comes to securing what we consider to be our national security objectives we can be just as pragmatic as the US. Therefore, we should stop pretending to be something we are not. There is no idealism involved in our relations with the US, and never has been. And this is a good thing.

Ahmadiyya Times | News Watch | Int'l Desk
Source/Credit: The News International
By Talat Farooq | December 10, 2011

According to some articles in the Western media before the Bonn Conference, Pakistan’s boycott of the event was in reaction to the Nato attack of Nov 26. But that was not the only reason, the writers said: by refusing to attend the conference Pakistan sought to avoid a debate on its involvement with the Taliban and its reluctance in fighting Islamists within its own territory. Furthermore, they argued, by boycotting the conference Pakistan sought to pressure the Taliban and the Haqqani network to negotiate with Karzai and the US and its NATO allies.

Such reports, although debatable, are a reminder of the realistic aspects of the US-Pakistan relations. What the US media dubs as Pakistan’s “duplicity” is actually applicable to the foreign policy conduct of both countries.

US-Pakistan relations have predominantly subscribed to the primacy of the two countries’ respective national security interests. Pakistan may act indignant for public consumption and blame the US for occasional backstabbing, but the fact remains that Pakistan has also used reverse influence to achieve desired outcomes.


This should be acceptable to the US because it too follows the Machiavellian concepts of statecraft without remorse. After all, Pakistan’s survival is just as important to us as America’s is to Americans. Our deaths are just as tragic as American deaths.

Political realism is that states exist in an anarchic international environment where there is no overarching world government; they therefore have to depend on their own resources and devices to survive. It also posits that there is a difference between domestic and international morality; domestically a national consensus may be possible because of commonality of interests but internationally each state endeavours to attain its own objectives at the cost of others’ interests.

Pakistan built its military capacity with American assistance during the Cold War. Each country was aware of the other’s motives in its joining the alliance: the US was focused on the global containment of Soviet Union and Pakistan had to maintain the regional balance of power against India. During the Afghan jihad Pakistan became the third-largest recipient of US aid and the US turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions for as long as the Soviets were in Afghanistan. Later, Pakistan managed to carry on with its nuclear programme despite coercive US sanctions in the 1990s.

The post-9/11 alliance is again based in pure realism. America wants a permanent presence in the area, albeit appearing to look victorious despite the reverses it suffered in the war. Pakistan continues to back the groups that it considers to be strategic assets while availing US aid. The US is well aware of this disparity but continues to engage and coerce Pakistan because it is in Washington’s interest to do so.

When it comes to securing what we consider to be our national security objectives we can be just as pragmatic as the US. Therefore, we should stop pretending to be something we are not. There is no idealism involved in our relations with the US, and never has been. And this is a good thing. If this marriage of convenience is to end in divorce then we need to take practical measures at the domestic and international levels to gain support for our case. (Attending the Bonn Conference specifically for this purpose may have been a good idea.) There is a need to engage in competent diplomacy with sustained focus on regional and Western audiences, especially the American public. It is, after all, the question of our survival and existential concerns.

While firmly protecting its national interests Pakistan needs to remember that the Afghans are capable of resolving their problems without unsolicited external help. Pakistan must show flexibility where that serves its vital objectives. In this regard it should reach out to Iran; Iranian cooperation is important in achieving a long-lasting solution in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan must provide moral support to Iran against the US and Western sanctions related to its nuclear programme. If the US is so keen to protect Israel to safeguard its own security and economic interests in the Middle East, then it should engage Iran instead of painting it as a demon.

Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia must also subscribe to simple, realistic goals. After all, Saudi Arabia has been a thorough realist all along; it has proved to be the guardian of not only the “Haramain Shareefain” but also of American interests in the Middle East. Its pragmatic policies are being amply manifested in the ongoing “Arab Spring” in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Pakistan also needs to keep its own interests in mind, especially with regard to its immediate neighbours. Relying less on rhetoric and more on the practical contours of bilateral relations Pakistan should address Chinese concerns, if any, and strengthen the military and economic aspects of its ties with China.

At the domestic level the foremost step that Pakistan needs to take is to curb corruption. All institutions, including the judiciary, the military and the parliament, must jointly device a strategy to do so. If that means sending Zardari and friends home, then so be it. Democracy is important, but for it to flourish and take root you need a country.

Only the honest and the upright can bring democracy to Pakistan; we do not have the luxury of waiting for the next sixty years while the corrupt loot and plunder with impunity. We can minimise our dependence on the US by using our own physical and human resources.

By now US policymakers ought to have realised that there is a limit to power – even American power. America cannot achieve all its security objectives through military force. Only by understanding the strategic compulsions of its less powerful ally can the US work towards a viable solution in Afghanistan.

Therefore, rather than listening to ill-informed senators to “get tough” with Pakistan, it must, as a realist, accept Pakistan’s dominant role in the resolution of the Afghanistan crisis. If it wants to exit honourably from Afghanistan, it should exert diplomatic pressure on the regional players, including Russia and India, to persuade them to cease supporting their Afghan proteges at the expense of Pakistan’s interests. Only a broad-based government with proportionate representation in Kabul can help resolve a conflict that has been raging since the 1990s. For this to happen, the US needs Pakistan’s cooperation, and not its hostility.


The writer is a PhD student at Leicester, UK. Email: talatfarooq11@gmail.com



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